Archive for the ‘Philosophy’ Category

Deirdre McCloskey Against Hedonomics

One of the most interesting classes I took in grad school was a class on the Philosophy of Happiness. It was taught by a brilliant professor, Dr. Erik Schmidt. In it, we covered both the history of happiness and surveyed much of the modern work being done to quantify happiness. This latter analysis of happiness is referred to as “Hedonics” for the psychological variant and “Hedonomics” if they attach numbers to their theories have their offices in the Economics building.

The results of modern examinations of happiness may yield some pretty interesting results in time, but for the moment, the majority of the work being done in the field is deeply flawed. From the arbitrary and insufficient modes of measurement to the often-biased sampling, there are a huge number of structural impediments that prevent hedonomics from being a rigorous or intellectually useful field.

Unfortunately, that hasn’t stopped people like Cass Sunstein from proposing that it should guide regulatory and legislative decisions.

In addition to methodological critiques, there are very compelling criticisms of some of the assumptions and findings of these new hedonic sciences. One of the critiques is hinted at in the structure of the class I mentioned; happiness hasn’t always meant what we understand it to mean today. And so if you study people’s self-assessed “happiness” through a variety of experiences and across demographics, you’re not really learning about Happiness-as-objective-phenomenon, rather you’re learning about what people understand the word “happiness” to mean. You’re learning “what we talk about when we talk about happiness”.

Which is an important thing to know, but it’s definitely not what the hedonomicists claim they’re measuring.

Another, more abstract, but equally damning family of objections are the philosophical and humanistic objections. Measuring and studying “happiness” as such assumes a lot of things about human nature, many of which are profoundly reductionist. If you assert that “happiness”, however defined, is the summum bonum of human existence, then the results of hedonomics studies tell you nothing less than the statistically significant path to the One True Good Life. This is perhaps best seen in the implicit value judgments made by people like Sunstein et. al. when they argue that people should be “nudged” or even forced to undertake certain actions that will make them “happier”.

In other words, many hedonomicists make the staggeringly vain assumption that the thing they are studying is the pure stuff of desirable outcomes. That the “happiness” they are getting people to self report is the marker of the best way to live and the only such marker.

I find this notion equal parts absurd and terrifying.

Another way to see these assumed value judgments is when researchers take as obvious the actionable implications of their findings. The “hedonic treadmill” is a fantastic example. One of the best established results of hedonomics is that beyond a certain level, increased wealth doesn’t cause people to self-report higher levels of “happiness”. Hedonomics responds to this by saying something like: “well clearly, people should stop trying to make more money once they reach that threshold.” What they don’t take into account is that increased income may very well improve people’s lives in other ways not accounted for by self-reported “happiness”. People who have more money can, for instance, devote themselves to higher intellectual and artistic pursuits. They can better secure themselves against personal, social, or economic disaster. They can invest to further or change their careers in order to succeed in personally satisfying ways that may not be appreciably evident in a self-reported assessment of “how happy I feel today.”

By asserting that there’s no reason to increase one’s income above a certain threshold just because it doesn’t increase arbitrary self-reported values is to smuggle the researcher’s value judgments in by the back door.

Hedonomics may some day give us valuable insights into the pursuit of human achievement, satisfaction, and personal accomplishment, but for now it is, with few notable exceptions, mostly bogged down in developing an elaborate, self-reported definition of the term “happiness”.

For a much better and more thorough argument in favor of a philosophic and humanist understanding of human satisfaction, I strongly encourage you to read this National Review essay, by the historian and economist Deirdre McCloskey. It is one of the most cohesive and damning humanist critiques of hedonomics I’ve seen yet and I think you’ll find it well worth your time and attention.

An excerpt:

“Before Bentham and Immanuel Kant, it was taken as obvious that the good life was multiple: involving the Principal Seven Virtues, for example, the primary colors of a virtuous and therefore happy life—prudence, temperance, courage, justice, faith, hope, and love. Humans do after all experience the tragedy of choice, which is the conflict of such virtues. Love for your father conflicts with your hope to go to Smith College, as Jane Addams found in her own life. Antigone’s faithfulness to her king conflicts with her love for her brother. Happinesses are not fungible. Happinesses are multiple, dappled things, and couple-colored. W.C. Fields was asked, off the record, for his views on sex. “On or off the record,” said he, “there may be some things better than sex, and some things worse. But there’s nothing exactly like it.”

The knock-down argument against the 1-2-3 studies of happiness comes from the philosopher’s (and the physicist’s) toolbox: a thought experiment. “Happiness” viewed as a self-reported mood is surely not the purpose of a fully human life, because, if you were given, in some brave new world, a drug like Aldous Huxley’s imagined “soma,” you would report a happiness of 3.0 to the researcher every time. Dopamine, an aptly named neurotransmitter in the brain, makes one “happy.” Get more of it, right? Something is deeply awry.

Decades ago, I was in Paris alone and decided to indulge myself with a good meal, which, you know, is rather easy to do in Paris. The dessert was something resembling crème brulée, but much, much better. I thought, “I shall give up my professorships at the University of Iowa in economics and history, retire to this neighborhood on whatever scraps of income I can assemble, and devote every waking moment to eating this dessert.” It seemed like a good idea at the time. It deserved a 3.0.”

I again strong encourage you to read the whole essay. I also strongly recommend McCloskey’s writings on the bourgeois, especially her books Bourgeois Virtue and Bourgeois Dignity.

Slavoj Zizek on Ecology and the Temptation of Meaning

This is a great ten-minute video of the philosopher Slavoj Zizek critiquing modern ecology. It’s taken from a documentary that’s supposed to be interviews with some the “great thinkers of our day”, but I’ve watched some of the other segments of the documentary, and they’re mostly just sophistic claptrap. Zizek, however, is in top form in this segment.

I quite like his point about the nature/artifice divide being wrong not because there is no artifice, but because nature, as we understand it as a harmonious and balanced system, doesn’t actually exist. So in that sense, “nature” just a world full of messy processes and giant catastrophes that we try to make sense of as best we can using analogy, metaphor, and reduction. We also insulate ourselves from that work of catastrophe with our clever machines and our “artificial” systems.

I also really like his conclusion that the great enemy of progress today (and despite his Marxist tendencies, Zizek is a Hegelian at heart and so probably a big fan of progress) is not the old liberal windmills of religion, corporate interests, etc. but rather of “ecology” broadly understood. We see this regularly these days with Green groups demanding sharp curtailing of economic growth, an end to the modern energy economy (which would result in economic stagnation, widespread suffering, and death), and the closing off of many branches of science that could be a huge benefit for human kind (e.g. GM foods, which have the potential to same billions of lives and bring down food prices all over the globe.) And they oppose this progress all in the name of a “natural world” which doesn’t actually exist, in the sense that nature isn’t a harmonious system the way greens want it to be.

But ultimately, I think it’s his conclusion that’s really killer. I think he goes off the rails a little bit towards the end, but I take his comments about the true ecologist loving trash as well to mean that any attempt at human ecology must first accept the byproducts of human existence. Per his opening comments, when we throw something away, it doesn’t just disappear. But that doesn’t mean we’re going to stop throwing things away. So a true human ecologist needs to love the human processes that create trash as much as he or she loves the messy, catastrophic world of so-called “nature”.

For my money, Zizek is one of the most interesting philosophers alive today, and I think that much of what he says is true and insightful. I definitely don’t agree with his philosophical or political conclusions (his views of ontology and the Real can be almost unspeakably goofy at times and his love for Marx completely baffles me), but some of his work on human beings in society and the ontology of modern society are pretty good.

I truly cannot tell at times whether Slavoj Zizek is serious or joking, but I’m not sure it matters all that much. He’s a fantastic gadfly who provokes good philosophy, either by his own critiques or by the creativity people employ to refute him. So whether he’s serious or not, I think he’s a good philosopher arguing in good faith, and there are precious few of those around these days.

H. L. Mencken on Morality and Honor

Two Quotes:

“It is a commonplace of moral science that absolute morality is impossible — in other words, that all men sin. What is often overlooked is that the same fallibility shows itself upon the higher level of what is called honor, which is simply the morality of superior men. A man who views himself as honorable usually labors under the delusion that his honor is unsullied, but this is never literally true. Every man, however honorable, occasionally sacrifices honor to mere morality behind the door, just as every man of morals sacrifices morality to self-interest.”

Et.

“Don’t tell me what delusion he entertains regarding God, or what mountebank he follows in politics, or what he springs from, or what he submits to from his wife. Simply tell me how he makes his living. It is the safest and surest of all known Tests. A man who gets his board and lodging on this ball in an ignominious way is inevitably an ignominious man.”

Both are from A Mencken Chrestomathy, (Vintage Books, 1982) pp. 111 and 20, respectively.

Thomas Sowell on Sophistry and Empiricism

The greatest triumph of human thought will be the triumph of logic and philosophy over sophistry and mysticism.

The greatest achievement of the Enlightenment will be the triumph of Empiricism over Pure Reason.

But neither of these battles are won. And to be honest, they might never be. The former has already been going for almost 2500 years. The latter for about a tenth as long.

In this video, Thomas Sowell lays out his critique of the role of intellectuals in public life. To my mind, two of the key points of Sowell’s argument are that intellectuals are often wrong (and dangerous when in the public sphere) because a.) they follow theory rather than evidence and b.) they are emotionally and egotistically invested in their theories.

In other words, intellectuals in modern society fail because they are fighting against the two greatest achievements of mankind. They are fighting against a genuine quest for knowledge and they are fighting in favor of Pure Reason rather than empirical understanding.

Even if you disagree with my assessment or with Dr. Sowell’s thesis, the interview above is well worth your time. It’s a great primer on the content of an important book and an often entertaining conversation between two brilliant thinkers.

Malthusianism: Not Just Wrong, but Dangerous

I’ve written before about my views on Malthusianism. But lately I’ve encountered some particularly good arguments to the effect that Malthusianism isn’t just wrong, but actively dangerous. Bryan Caplan, writing at EconLog, raises some good points about the role that Malthusianism played in the rise of Nazism. In short, Malthusianism, and more particularly the belief that there wasn’t enough room and resources on the planet for everyone, was one of the driving forces behind Hitler’s crimes. As Caplan put it, “[Malthusianism] told them that millions had to die; [eugenics] told them who the victims ought to be.”

This, to me, highlights one of the reasons why it’s so important to speak out against gloom and doom and to be a voice of anti-Malthusian optimism. The idea that scarcity of land and resources demands the restriction of human populations isn’t just flawed, but it can and has caused real suffering. At the bare minimum, it can lead to unnecessary worry. It can also lead to prolonged misery through retarding economic growth and the advancement of prosperity. And at its worst it can, and has, lead to forced sterilizations and mass exterminations.1

The wonderful writer Robert Zubrin has a new book out about the dangers of doomsayers. I haven’t had a chance to read it, yet, but it’s high on my list. Zubrin recently did an interview about the book with Reason TV, and I think he makes his case well:

I like the way Zubrin frames his argument by saying that the dangers from “Merchants of Despair” (his words) actually far outstrips the dangers we face from the evils they’re “warning” us about.

One counter-argument is that Caplan’s article and Zubrin’s interview make Malthusians out to be almost cartoonishly villainous in their plans for the human species. As such, I understand skepticism about whether or not anyone actually believes in the brand of anti-humanist Malthusianism that Caplan and Zubrin describe. One proof of the existence of real-life Malthusians comes by way of the Azizonomics blog which posts excerpts from Finnish writer Pentti Linkola who says, among other things, that:

“Any dictatorship would be better than modern democracy. There cannot be so incompetent a dictator that he would show more stupidity than a majority of the people. The best dictatorship would be one where lots of heads would roll and where government would prevent any economical growth.”

If this were the ravings of a lunatic or a Bell Street trustfund hipster they’d be easy to ignore. But this man is an influential writer and a key figure in the Deep Ecology movement. His views aren’t just considered, but embraced by a segment of the population that would rather see the human race eradicated than see it flourish and who unapologetically embrace dictatorial governance in pursuit of that end.

I think anyone who desires a dictatorship with the explicit goal of murdering people and completely curtailing economic growth is, at best, a moral cripple. And yet we live in a world where people like Linkola are given a serious hearing. Indeed, Bryan Caplan’s essay that I linked to above would be easy to dismiss as its own brand of fear mongering, if it weren’t for the fact that there are people out there today who are actually calling for Nazi-style dictatorial governments for the express purposes of satisfying their anti-humanist urges. And those pro-dictatorial types are using explicitly Malthusian arguments, just as the Nazis did almost 80 years ago.

Meanwhile, thankfully, the human species continues to flourish. Global poverty is declining; global health is improving. Our understanding of the world continues to advance and, with it, the power of the tools we use to shape it. Life is good and getting better. And it is doing so in spite of the Merchants of Despair and their despicable anti-humanism.


Disclosure Notice

1And lest you think that things like forced sterilization are a thing of the past, UN economic aid is often contingent on a country having some method of population control in place. This means that taxpayers in the US and Europe are helping to fund and encourage the forced sterilization of Indian women.

The Copernican Principle and the Era of Humanity in Space

The ever-interesting Paul Gilster over at Centauri Dreams writes about the argument that we’re as likely to be at the end of human spaceflight as the beginning. In brief, Gilster gives serious consideration to Richard Gott’s view that, due to the Copernican Principle, we have no reason to believe that our time in the universe is special, just as our location in the universe certainly isn’t. Therefore, we have no reason to prefer the idea that we’re at the beginning of a glorious era of spaceflight over the notion that humanities days in space are all but over.

As I see it, Gott makes two fatal errors in his skepticism of human space flight. The first is in his application of cosmic-scale principles to social-scale phenomena, and the second is in embracing ungrounded Rationalism over Empiricism.

The Copernican Principle makes a great deal of sense in cosmic scale systems and on cosmic scales of time. The universe is unspeakably vast and we are adrift somewhere within it. The age of the cosmos is mind-bogglingly long and, in comparison, our species has only been around for a very brief moment.

There’s no reason to think our place in this vastness is unusual. Nor any reason to believe that our few hundred thousand years is better or more preferable to the next few hundred thousand.

But we, as a species, don’t act or live on cosmic scales. We are, to paraphrase Richard Dawkins, “medium-sized objects moving at medium-sized speeds through a medium-sized world”. To apply cosmic-sized principles to us is to commit a Fallacy of Composition. Roughly: “Our place in the cosmos seems to obey principle X, therefore our place in human history must obey principle X.” Human history is a vanishingly small part of cosmic history and just because a principle applies to the whole doesn’t mean it applies to every fragment of it.1

On the second score, Gott embraces the sort of mystical Rationalism that Hume and Kant should have put in the ground hundreds of years ago. Hume is my homeboy, so I’ll focus on his critiques.

Hume accurately pointed out that pure Rationalism has little to no explanatory power. It is essentially the quest for internally-consistent worlds unmoored from the real one. Reason alone cannot accurately predict, for instance, how two billiard balls will behave when they collide. Instead, one needs to have seen billiard balls collide before and used reason to understand the principles involved. Reason, in other words, must serve empirical observation. This was one of the greatest results of the Enlightenment.

Gott commits the sin of pure reason by discarding his observation and saying, well, there’s no purely logical reason why space flight has to move forward. It’s logically self-consistent that we might scrap all our rockets, turn our noses back to Earth, and never seek space again.

Yes. That’s true. But it’s completely unhelpful and as likely to be wrong as it is to be right. That’s because it throws out everything we know about human ingenuity, curiosity, desire, and acquisitiveness. I mean, hell, as we speak there are people seriously trying to solve the problem of mining asteroids. But sure, it’s possible that we’re at the end of the era of human space flight. Just as it’s logically possible that when two billiard balls strike each other at whatever speeds and from whatever angles that they should stop entirely. We only know that’s not true because of our observations of how billiard balls behave in the real world.

In essence, Gott is asking the wrong question. He’s asking: “What reason do I have for believing that we are at the start, rather than the end, of human space flight, and is that reason consistently defensible?” In a post-Enlightenment world, the correct question to be asking is: “Where’s the evidence that we’re at the end of human space flight?” Personally, I see tons of evidence that we’re at the beginning, but none at all that we’re at the end. Therefore the only reasonable conclusion that I can make is that we as a species still have a bright future in space.

UPDATE: I strongly encourage you to read the Centauri Dreams post linked above. My post focuses only on a very narrow part of it, and there is much more to Gott’s argument and Gilster’s commentary than I address here.


1 This argument is isomorphic to the one presented in response to anti-evolution types who falsely invoke the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Entropy must increase on a cosmic scale and in any closed system, true. But our planet is not the cosmos, nor is it a closed system. It’s just a part of the whole. The system obeys the law and so we, at least for a little while, can get a pass and the law still holds.

Jonathan Haidt and Moral Foundation Theory

Jonathan Haidt is one of the most important thinkers of our time. I feel I can offer that statement without qualifying adjectives because he was, so far as I know, the first person to appropriately combine two of the most powerful ideas of the Enlightenment: rigorous Empiricism and the Theory of Moral Sentiment.

Haidt’s creation, Moral Foundations Theory, asks an extremely important meta-ethical question: what rubrics or heuristics do we use to resolve moral questions or to make moral judgments? That, in itself, isn’t a new question. For me, the best pre-Haidt account of the sources of Ethics is Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self in which the Catholic philosopher makes a compelling case for moral frameworks based around sources of value or “hypergoods”. In other words, each of us has some set of abstract Forms in comparison to which we form all value judgments. If “Health” is a hypergood for a particular individual, then they will value highly things like exercise and clean living.1

This bears interesting resemblance to Haidt’s much more rigorous, much less philosophical work, in which he actually tries to determine empirically what our sources of value are and what mental heuristics we use to form our moral sentiments. It’s an interesting and important project, but even more interesting are the results. Haidt’s experiments (which you can learn more about and participate in at the Moral Foundations Theory Homepage) have found six primary sources for human moral values. They are:

1) Care/harm: This foundation is related to our long evolution as mammals with attachment systems and an ability to feel (and dislike) the pain of others. It underlies virtues of kindness, gentleness, and nurturance.
2) Fairness/cheating: This foundation is related to the evolutionary process of reciprocal altruism. It generates ideas of justice, rights, and autonomy. [Note: In our original conception, Fairness included concerns about equality, which are more strongly endorsed by political liberals. However, as we reformulated the theory in 2011 based on new data, we emphasize proportionality, which is endorsed by everyone, but is more strongly endorsed by conservatives]
3) Liberty/oppression: This foundation is about the feelings of reactance and resentment people feel toward those who dominate them and restrict their liberty. Its intuitions are often in tension with those of the authority foundation. The hatred of bullies and dominators motivates people to come together, in solidarity, to oppose or take down the oppressor.
4) Loyalty/betrayal: This foundation is related to our long history as tribal creatures able to form shifting coalitions. It underlies virtues of patriotism and self-sacrifice for the group. It is active anytime people feel that it’s “one for all, and all for one.”
5) Authority/subversion: This foundation was shaped by our long primate history of hierarchical social interactions. It underlies virtues of leadership and followership, including deference to legitimate authority and respect for traditions.
6) Sanctity/degradation: This foundation was shaped by the psychology of disgust and contamination. It underlies religious notions of striving to live in an elevated, less carnal, more noble way. It underlies the widespread idea that the body is a temple which can be desecrated by immoral activities and contaminants (an idea not unique to religious traditions).

This is an interesting result in and of itself, but what’s even more striking are the differences in which various groups emphasize which moral foundations. In the political sphere, Haidt &co. found that Liberals a strong propensity to understand moral questions in terms of Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating, while conservatives showed a more balanced orientation towards all of the various moral foundations. As one might imagine, Libertarians were extremely skewed towards Liberty/Oppression. (For more on these interesting political differences, see Haidt’s excellent summary of his findings in this essay on the Moral Foundations of Occupy Wall Street.)

This, to me, is perhaps one of the most important concrete conclusion’s of Haidt’s work. Which is the main reason why I’m very excited that it is the focal point for Haidt’s new book, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. The large political divides in every Western democracy are, at least in part, differences in values. Actually, they’re much more fundamental than that, because they’re differences in moral axioms. Liberals, conservatives, libertarians, statists, anarchists, etc. often differ not only in their ideas, but in the sources of their value. Whether you call them “hypergoods” or “moral foundations”, the fact remains that one of the reasons we disagree is because when presented with the same moral question, we break out entirely different tool kits to help us resolve it.

Personally, I’m very excited about Haidt’s new book, and I look forward to hearing more of the results of his research. He’s already done an incredible service to the cause of human understanding and self-reflection, and I hope his contributions continue for many years to come.


Disclosure Notice

1 I have a theory that many modern discontents are caused by a profusion of hypergoods. Our globally connected world means that we get exposed to the extolations and value judgments of so many people that we begin to try and adopt too many hypergoods. And so we end up feeling like we have to be Healthy and Green and Wise and Civil and Religious/Areligious and Thrifty and Wealthy and Relaxed and Hard-Working and and and… This leads to huge conflicts in our judgments of value meaning that we can’t do anything without feeling at least a little bit guilty about it. Because no matter what we do, we’ll be in violation of one of the many hypergoods we’ve acquired. Interestingly enough, this ends up in practice turning into the same kind of neo-Puritans that H. L. Mencken mocked in American society a century ago.

BitCoins, Money, and Winning the Currency “Game”

I got linked to an essay by Jon Callas in which he talks about something that he claims is an amazing property of BitCoins:

Did you know that if a Bitcoin is destroyed, then the value of all the other Bitcoins goes up slightly? That’s incredible.

Now there are many properties of BitCoins that actually are incredible. The distributed generation and book-keeping system is awesome, as is the cryptographic trickery underpinning the coins themselves. On a more abstract notion, the whole idea of a pure-virtual currency is itself pretty incredible, seeing as how it seems at first intuitively impossible to satisfy the requirements of finitude and transferrability required for a medium to actually be a currency.1

But this deflationary property that Callas calls out isn’t one of BitCoin’s incredible properties. In fact it isn’t incredible at all. It’s a simple and obvious result of the fact that BitCoins are a currency. The fact that destroying a unit of currency causes deflation holds true no matter what currency you’re talking about. If I were to melt down the change in my change jar here in my desk, the value of all other American currency would rise slightly. Very very slightly. Imperceptibly so, in fact, but it would rise.2

There are a few questions around the destruction of physical currency versus BitCoins3, but Callas doesn’t actually address any of them. Rather he inducts from his observation that destroying a BitCoin causes a very small amount of deflation and proposes that there’s are a few dominant strategies to maximize the value of your BitCoins (a pursuit he gives the excellent title of “the BitCoin Game”.)

His three dominant strategies:

(1) Create more Bitcoins.
(2) Buy up more Bitcoins, with the end state of that strategy being that you’ve cornered the market.
(3) Destroy other people’s Bitcoins. The end state of that is also that you’ve cornered the market.

I submit that none of these will actually accomplish the state goal of the BitCoin game of “maximizing the value of your BitCoins”.

Wither regards to point 1, if you create more BitCoins, this will have the opposite effect that Callas (rightly) identified with destroying them. To whit, each coin you create will very slightly decrease the value of all the other BitCoins in existence, including your own. Now if you were the only person creating BitCoins, then there’s a chance that your total value of coins would increase fast enough to outpace BitCoin inflation, but since BitCoins are a distributed currency which anyone can work at creating, this seems unlikely. The much more likely scenario (and the one baked into the design of the currency) is that many people will create more BitCoins, thus distributing the effects of inflation fairly evenly. The sinking ship of BitCoin value will sink with an even keel and everyone will lose out in balanced measure.

As for 2 and 3, I’ll lump these together, both because Callas did and because Callas correctly understood that they have the same end result. Whether you buy up all the BitCoins or destroy everyone else’s BitCoins, you end up with all of them and they end up with none. Callas identifies this state with “winning the BitCoin game” and asserts that this would turn a distributed currency into a centralized currency. He’s incorrect on both counts.

First of all, if one person monopolized all BitCoins leaving everyone else with none while also destroying or buying at very low prices the coins produced by other people, then the value of BitCoins would very quickly drop to zero. The deflationary effect of destroying currency is not monotonic, and hoarding a currency that no one else values doesn’t make you rich.

You see, the fatal mistake that Callas his made is that he’s treating value as objective, when in fact all value is subjective. If I were to destroy all other US Dollars in the world except for the contents of my change jar, I wouldn’t have maximized the value of my currency. There’s probably $100 worth of coinage in there now, but if all other US currency was destroyed, then when I went to spend it, I’d have a hard time getting anyone to accept it. I’d probably find that people had stopped using dollars in favor of something more available (read: usable) and hence, more valuable. I wouldn’t have maximized the value of my currency, I would have destroyed it.

This is also why Callas’ second conclusion is incorrect. If BitCoins got “centralized” in the sense that one person horded all of them, then BitCoins wouldn’t become a centralized currency, rather they’d stop being a currency altogether. Currency, after all, is nothing but a token for deferred barter. In order for a medium to fill that role, it needs to have several properties including the ability to be transferred (circulate) and it needs to be trusted. A world in which one person destroyed any BitCoin they didn’t control would be one in which no one would trust BitCoins and so no one would use them. BitCoins would cease to be a currency altogether. Similarly, if that person just horded all the BitCoins and never used them for anything, BitCoins would be permanently unavailable and so people would abandon it in favor of other currencies that actually, you know, worked as currencies.


1 – For more on this, cf. this post.

2 – In a bizarre paradox of inefficiencies, it’s also possible that, if my change jar were to contain enough pennies and nickels, I might be able to also increase my own net worth, since the resulting plug of slag might be worth more than the face value of the coins that when into it. For more on this, cf. this video of author John Green getting hilariously worked up.

3 – E.g. the metaphysical question of what it means to “destroy” a BitCoin, since such coins are actually numerical constructs and, hence, numinal and indestructible. Of course a practical form of destruction would just be that BitCoin and all traces of it being deleted from all the computational media in the world.

“When you’re tired of London…”

Robert Kunzig, writing for National Geographic, has an excellent essay about the rise and role of cities in the late 20th century. It’s a great overview of many of the reasons why urbanization is a fantastic trend and one that we should all hope continues as our global population increases. He also tells several interesting anecdotes about global Alpha cities like Seoul and London.

He notes in passing, however, an unfortunate anti-urbanism strain taking hold. He notes that the South Korean government is trying to intentionally break up Seoul, one of the major engines of their prosperity, in order to “spread the wealth around” and, I get the sense, to return to a more “authentic” culture and lifestyle. This is a truly unfortunate trend since, as Kunzig points out, cities are economically and environmentally superior to a more sprawling agrarian or rural lifestyle.

Being of a philosophical bent, though, I’d also argue against the idea that a rural life is a more authentic one. I believe that human nature naturally inclines us as a species towards life in the Polis. Aristotle said that the city was the natural habitat of the human being. The city is to a human being as the bamboo forest is to a panda. This is an attractive notion to me personally, seeing as how I love cities to an almost unseemly extent, but I think it provides a nice complement to the more practical arguments. Forcing people who want to live in cities, who freely gravitate towards a more densely populated urban environment, to move elsewhere isn’t just a bad idea, it runs contrary to human nature. People tend to react poorly to attempted violations or alterations of their nature and that can lead to any number of social ills. This is articulated very well in Thomas Sowell’s excellent book A Conflict of Visions and especially his discussion of the unconstrained vision.

To try and “encourage” people to abandon the cities to which they’ve freely chosen to migrate is a perfect example of the Unconstrained Vision, as it basically asserts that, despite people’s free personal choices to the contrary, a rural way of life is inherently superior. People may want to live in the city, but what they want is less important than what the government asserts they should want.

Of course Sowell’s point is that conscious quests to reform human nature are doomed to failure. Cities are an emergent expression of human nature and the only way to truly reverse urbanization is to act against that nature. One can’t reform it, it shows no signs of changing on its own, so the only way to counteract it is to do so coercively.

All the evidence that we have seen, from cultures all over the world shows that human beings will choose to live in cities when the option is available to them. As of a few years ago, more people live in cities than in rural areas for the first time in human history. This tipping point zipped by without too much fanfare, but I think it’s a remarkable milestone and one that should be celebrated. It means that, for the first time ever, more than half of our brothers and sisters finally live in their natural environment. More than half the human species is finally able to enjoy the fruits of one of mankind’s greatest developments: the city. This is truly a momentous milestone and we should be happy for that fact and looking forward to the time when three fourths, or nine tenths of people have that same opportunity.

That some people, mostly in the meddling class, see this tidal wave of people choosing to live in the polis as a problem is worrying, since their attempts to reverse the trend can only come to ill one way or another. At best they may waste (our) time and resources fighting the useless fight. At worst, they use coercive force to try and change the calculus. China, in fact, is already well on the path to this second option, having implemented an execrable system of internal passports, meaning that millions of people who want desperately to enjoy the benefits of the city cannot do so without risking imprisonment or death.

Ultimately, though, no government can truly stop the course of humanity. This, indeed, is one of the main points of Sowell’s book. The force of human nature, aggregated over the billions-strong population of the planet, is stronger than any attempt to hold it back. Cities are here to stay and urbanization will continue so long as people continue to strive to fulfill their own goals and desires. No government can stop that, but they can definitely make the process more painful than it needs to be.

History, 9/11, and the Dangers of “Narratives”

The truth resists simplicity.” – John Green

The economist Tyler Cowen gave a TED talk earlier this year about the dangers of thinking in “Stories”. He makes some excellent points regarding the fact that, though stories are a deeply ingrained part of human nature, they almost always conceal as much as they reveal. The world isn’t carved up into stories by default and in doing the carving ourselves important details get lost, facts get twisted, and emphasis gets assigned where it doesn’t belong.

I think that you’ll find his talk worth the 17 minutes you spend on it. If you’re so inclined, you can do that now:

In talking about stories, Cowen touches one of the most dangerous memes of modern thought: the Narrative. Now narratives are wonderful things in novels or other fiction, but narrative technique is increasingly being applied the factual world around us as a way to shape or distort our understanding of it. In Aristotle’s time this would have been called Sophistry. Today it’s called “Social Sciences”.

But the point remains the same. Narratives are used to take the facts and make them fit a particular worldview rather than the other way around. They are a way to take a common stock of facts and, through omission, emphasis, and distortion, use them to tell a just-so story about the world we find ourselves in.

These stories, of course, tend to grow up mycologically around significant events. The recent global financial crisis has spawned a profusion of narratives, as have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as has the Arab Spring.

Of course no event of recent American history has spawned more narratives than 9/11. Some tell us that it was the first blow in a war of good versus evil. Some tell us that this was the evil empire getting its comeuppance. Some tell us this was our sack of Rome or, at the very least, our Lost Legions. But of course it wasn’t any of those things. It was far more complex and, to use Cowen’s word, messy. It was an event born from incomprehensible chain of choice and motivation. No story could possibly encompass the truth of what happened, and by trying to reduce thousands of lives into a simple narrative we delude ourselves about what really happened.

This is one of the reasons why Simon Schama’s piece for BBC News on 9/11 was so refreshing. The only stories he tells are memories. He uses them to highlight, powerfully, that this event matters and still ought to matter. But he does so without presuming to tell us a story about what it means. He demands that we pay attention, but doesn’t tell us where this is all going.

Human beings are story tellers by nature and so it’s probably no surprise that we try to understand the world in the form of narrative arcs. But while narrative arcs work well for the constrained world of fiction, they are inherently insufficient to help us navigate the real world. Even more troubling is the fact that narratives are inherently skewed. Not all are biased (though, per H. L. Mencken, Americans can’t resist a morality tale and so ours almost invariably are) but all of them make errors of emphasis or value. So at the best of times narratives are incomplete and at the worst of times they lead us actively astray.

And so I think Cowen’s call to resist the temptation towards stories and narratives is important, as is Schama’s call to attend to an event like 9/11 and to not write it off into the past so quickly. Stories may help us understand our myths, our culture, ourselves, or even our past, but they’re an extremely poor way to try and understand our present or to guide us as we build our future. Because the truth resists simplicity, and we do ourselves no favors by trying to force simplicity upon it.

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Magic Blue Smoke

House Rules:

1.) Carry out your own dead.
2.) No opium smoking in the elevators.
3.) In Competitions, during gunfire or while bombs are falling, players may take cover without penalty for ceasing play.
4.) A player whose stroke is affected by the simultaneous explosion of a bomb may play another ball from the same place.
4a.) Penalty one stroke.
5.) Pilsner should be in Roman type, and begin with a capital.
6.) Keep Calm and Kill It with Fire.
7.) Spammers will be fed to the Crabipede.